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Abstract—The new European General Data Protection Regu-
lation places stringent restrictions on the processing of person-
ally identifiable data. The GDPR does not only affect European
companies, as the regulation applies to all the organizations
that track or provide services to European citizens. Free
exploratory data analysis is permitted only on anonymous data,
at the cost of some legal risks. We argue that for the other kinds
of personal data processing, the most flexible and safe legal
basis is explicit consent. We illustrate the approach to consent
management and compliance with the GDPR being developed
by the European H2020 project SPECIAL, and highlight some
related big data aspects.
Keywords-Personal Data Processing, Analytics, Anonymiza-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The new European General Data Protection Regulation1
(GDPR), that has come into force on May 25, 2018, places
stringent restrictions on the processing of personally iden-
tifiable data. The GDPR does not only affect European
companies, as the regulation applies to all the organizations
that track or provide services to European citizens (cf.
Article 3).2 Infringements may severely affect the reputation
of the violators, and are subject to substantial administrative
fines (up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover or
20 million Euro, whichever is higher). Therefore, the risks
associated to infringements constitute a major disincentive
to the abuse of personal data. Given that the collection
and the analysis of personal data are paramount sources
of innovation and revenue, companies are interested in
maximizing personal data usage within the limits posed by
the GDPR. Consequently, data controllers (i.e. the personal
and legal entities that process personal data) are looking for
methodological and technological means to comply with the
regulation’s requirements efficiently and safely.
The GDPR is changing the way personal data are pro-
cessed. It states that by default, personal data shall not
1http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-INIT/en/
pdf
2Moreover, the case of Cambridege Analytica and the increasing number
of information abuses and related crimes are fostering discussions outside
Europe about the opportunity of adopting regulations similar to the GDPR.
California has recently approved a Consumer privacy act (CCPA) that is
similar to GDPR in many respects, see for example https://iapp.org/news/
a/gdpr-matchup-california-consumer-privacy-act/ for a comparison.
be processed, and in this way it encourages the use of
anonymous data. They are not regarded as personal data,
so anonymous data lie outside the scope of the GDPR and
can be freely used. Subsequently, the regulation introduces
a list of exceptions to the default prohibition. Personal data
can be collected, stored, and analyzed according to the legal
bases defined in Article 6 of the GDPR. Some examples of
such legal bases include public interest, the vital interests
of the data subject, contracts, and the legitimate interests of
the data controller, just to name a few. These legal bases
are constrained by a number of provisos and caveats that
restrict their applicability.3 So, in practice, the kinds of
personal data processing that are most useful for data-driven
applications are almost exclusively allowed by another legal
basis, namely, the explicit consent of the data subjects.4
In the following, we discuss the two mainstream options
offered by the GDPR, namely anonymization and explicit
consent. We will argue that currently anonymization tech-
niques cannot be extensively applied in the applications
grounded on big data processing and analytics; this will
lead us to focus on consent management. The approach to
anonymization and consent management we propose here
is being developed within the European H2020 project
SPECIAL.5 The main use cases of the project are provided
by three of its industrial partners, namely Deutsche Telekom,
Proximus, and Thomson Reuters.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section II presents the challenges associated with ensuring
that data is legally anonymous. Section III discusses the role
of consent as a legal basis for personal data processing, and
the machine-understandable encoding of consent. Section IV
examines the aspects of consent management that may
be regarded as big data themselves. Section V points to
alternative work on GDPR compliance and differentiates
our work from related approaches. Finally, we present our
conclusions and interesting directions for future work in
Section VI.
3Of particular relevance here are the data minimization principle intro-
duced in Article 5, and the limitations to the legitimate interests of the
controller rooted in Article 6.1(f).
4Article 6.1(a)
5https://www.specialprivacy.eu/
II. ANONYMIZATION
Article 4.(1) of the GDPR states that for the purpose of the
regulation, “personal data” means any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person (the data subject),
where:
an identifiable natural person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular
by reference to an identifier such as a name,
an identification number, location data, an online
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity of that natural person.
Moreover, recital6 26 explains that:
To determine whether a natural person is iden-
tifiable, account should be taken of all the means
reasonably likely to be used [...] either by the
controller or by another person to identify the
natural person directly or indirectly.
The available technologies for analytics, that leverage the
available big data sources, are superb examples of such
indirect identification means. Their effectiveness in identi-
fying individuals based on their “behavioral fingerprint” is
witnessed by a number of applications and cases, illustrated
in detail in the extensive report by Christl and Spiekermann
[1]. In this context it is difficult to assess whether any of
the available anonymization methods produces data that are
legally anonymous. In the following we discuss this issue
with respect to the two main families of anonymization
approaches, namely:
• k-anonymity and its evolution, such as l-diversity and
t-closeness, just to name a few;
• -differential privacy and its refinements.
The reader is referred to [2] for an overview of anonymisa-
tion criteria and techniques – including the above approaches
– and a discussion of their pros and cons.
The methods applying to the first family typically operate
by removing information (e.g. by deleting day and month
from birth dates); the methods applying to the second family
typically introduce noise in query answers or directly in the
data, in a controlled way (special methods are available for
non-numeric data). Still there exist relationships between the
two families, see for example [3], [4].
A first difficulty in avoiding the GDPR’s restrictions
through data anonymization is that the guarantees provided
by anonymization methods and the requirements posed by
the GDPR have different natures. For example, the goal of
k-anonymity is having each record match at least k different
individuals. Clearly, as k grows, the re-identification of data
subjects does not become easier, but how can one assess, for
6In law, a recital consists of an account or repetition of the details of
some legal document, that clarifies the document’s purpose and its intended
interpretation.
a given k, that there is no “reasonable” mean to re-identify
a data subject, as required by the regulation’s definition
of anonymous data? Similar arguments hold for the other
methods in the same family, i.e. l-diversity and t-closeness.
Differential privacy guarantees that by anonymizing a dataset
(or its view), the knowledge about “which data subjects
are described in the dataset” is approximately the same
before and after querying the dataset’s anonymized view.
Such knowledge is expressed in terms of all pairs of similar
databases, that differ in one record (the one that represents
the considered data subject); in particular, the ratio between
the probability of the two datasets – given the query result –
should be bounded by exp(), where  is a given parameter.
Again, there is no formal way of assessing that the legal
notion of anonymity is met for a given  (also due to the
influence of background knowledge, discussed below).
Will the legislators eventually stipulate that the GDPR’s
definition of anonymity is met for some standardized values
of the parameters k, l, t and ? This is unlikely, given that
the degree of protection ensured by any parameter choice
depends on the additional data sources available to an at-
tacker, and that the amount of such background knowledge is
difficult to estimate. In more formal terms, all anonymization
methods are vulnerable to attacks based on background
knowledge (and, in particular, to the aggregation of different
information sources), see for example [5], [6], [7], [8].
Therefore, even if the mismatch between the technical and
the legal definitions were reconciled, still the difficulty of
estimating the amount of available backround knowledge
would be reflected on the estimate of acceptable parameter
values.
A further, well known issue in data anonymization is that
by removing details and introducing noise, anonymisation
methods decrease data quality and – consequently – data
utility [2], [9], [6], [10], [7]. The required anonymisation
level may turn out to be incompatible with the necessary data
quality in many applications. An immediate consequence
of the negative effects of anonymization on data quality
is that the problem of estimating the available background
knowledge cannot be simply bypassed through a cautious,
very “conservative” choice of the privacy parameters.
In the light of the above discussion it is clear that –
as of today – anonymous data and anonymized data are
two distinct concepts, and that data controllers make use of
anonymization methods at their own risk. The regulation’s
youth and the consequent lack of court decisions make
the assessment of legal risks even harder. For this reason,
SPECIAL is focussing its efforts on the other mainstream
approach at personal data processing, that is, consent man-
agement (that is the subject of the next section). Still,
anonymization methods play an interesting role, that will
be illustrated in the following.
III. DATA USAGE DESCRIPTIONS AND CONSENT
MANAGEMENT
The GDPR poses at least two requirements that call
for a machine-understandable representation of data usage
modalities.
Article 30 states that each controller shall maintain a
record of the personal data processing activities under its
responsibility. The first paragraph specifies that such a ledger
should describe (among other information) the following
aspects of data usage:
P1. the purpose of processing;
P2. a description of the categories of data subjects and of
the categories of personal data;
P3. the categories of recipients to whom the personal data
have been or will be disclosed;
P4. transfers of personal data to a third country or an inter-
national organisation (since cross-border data transfer
are subject to limitations);
P5. the envisaged time limits for erasure of the different
categories of data;
P6. information about the processing, such as the security
measures mentioned in Article 32.
Recital 42 stresses that, where processing is based on the
data subject’s consent, the controller should be able to
demonstrate that the data subject has given consent to
the processing operation. SPECIAL addresses this issue by
recording consent in a transparency ledger. The description
of consent is similar to the description of processing activi-
ties as per Article 30. While Article 6.1.(a) – that introduces
consent as a legal basis for personal data processing – and
Recital 42 explicitly mention only the purpose of processing,
Articles 13 and 14 add the other elements P2–P6 listed
above. Concerning P6 (processing), it should be specified
whether any automated decision making is involved, includ-
ing profiling.
Once such data usage descriptions are encoded in a
machine-understandable way, several tasks, related to GDPR
compliance, can be automated, including:
T1. Checking whether the processing complies with several
restrictions imposed by the GDPR, such as additional
requirements on the processing of sensitive data, re-
strictions on cross-border transfers, and compatibility
of data usage with the chosen legal basis. This kind of
validation requires a machine-understandable formal-
ization of the relevant parts of the GDPR.
T2. Checking whether a specific operation is permitted by
the available consent.
T3. Running ex-post auditing on the controller’s activities.
In SPECIAL this task is supported by logging data
processing events in the transparency ledger, and com-
paring such events with consent.
T4. Finding the consent that justifies a specific processing
(for auditing or responding to a data subject’s enquiry).
The transparency ledger can also be used to provide
dashbords to data subjects, that support them in monitoring
the use of their data and explaining why their consent
allowed specific operations. Such dashboards can also be
used as a uniform interface to let data subjects exercise their
rights (access to data, right to erasure, etc.) as specified by
Articles 15–18 and 21–22.
A. Issues in Collecting Consent
The range of approaches to collecting consent from data
subjects lies between two extreme approaches.
• (Purely static) Consent is requested a priori, listing in
one document all the possible variants of data process-
ing that the controller may carry out in the future. The
result is a very long document that users typically do
not fully read and do not fully understand.
• (Purely dynamic) Consent is requested on the fly for
each specific operation being executed. The user is
pestered by requests, many of which are similar.
In both cases, data subjects may be induced to deny consent,
and possibly stop using the service. SPECIAL is addressing
this issue in two ways:
• Experimenting with a novel, incremental dynamic ap-
proach that lies in between the above two extremes [11].
• Re-using previous consent, as explained in the follow-
ing sections.
Another difficulty that currently seems to have no solution
is related to exploratory data analysis and mining. This
kind of processing fosters innovation by discovering new
knowledge, that may suggest novel services and applications.
However, by its very nature, such exploratory analyses do
not have any specific pre-conceived purpose, and – unfor-
tunately – “finding novel interesting relationships among
data” is considered too vague to constitute the purpose of a
valid consent request.7 Consequently, exploratory analyses
are possible only on anonymous data, under the difficulties
mentioned in Section II.
Anonymization techniques may also be used together with
consent to increase the percentage of opt-in’s. In this case
anonymization acts as a guarantee of protection, that may
encourage data subjects to consent to data processing. The
processing – at the same time – is legally permitted by
consent, so the probability of re-identification, in this case,
does not affect compliance with the GDPR.
B. Encoding Usage Descriptions and Consent
The common structure of the activity records and of the
consent forms, consisting of properties P1–P6, is called
simple (usage) policy in SPECIAL. In general, both the
controller’s activities and the consent of data subjects can
7Consent must be “specific” (par. 4.(11) and 6.1(a)); recital 39 insists that
“purposes [...] should be [...] determined at the time of collection of the
personal data”. The only case where purposes might not be “fully identified”
a priori is scientific research, cf. recital 33.
be described by a set of simple usage policies (covering
different data categories and purposes), called full (usage)
policies. Each simple policy can be specified simply by
attaching to each property Pi (such as purpose, data category,
recipients, etc.) a term selected from a suitable vocabulary
(ontology).
Example 3.1: A company – call it BeFit – sells a wear-
able fitness appliance and wants (i) to process biometric
data (stored in the EU) for sending health-related advice
to its customers, and (ii) share the customer’s location data
with their friends. Location data are kept for a minimum
of one year but no longer than 5; biometric data are kept
for an unspecified amount of time. In order to do all this
legally, BeFit needs consent from its customers. Consent
can be represented with two simple policies, specified using
SPECIAL’s vocabularies:
{
has_purpose: FitnessRecommendation,
has_data: BiometricData,
has_processing: Analytics,
has_recipient: BeFit,
has_storage: { has_location: EU }
}
{
has_purpose: SocialNetworking,
has_data: LocationData,
has_processing: Transfer,
has_recipient: DataSubjFriends,
has_storage: {
has_location: EU,
has_duration: [1year,5year]
}
}
If “HeartRate” is a subclass of “BiometricData” and
“ComputeAvg” is a subclass of “Analytics”, then the above
consent allows BeFit to compute the average heart rate of the
data subject in order to send her fitness recommendations.
BeFit customers may restrict their consent, e.g. by picking
a specific recommendation modality, like “recommendation
via SMS only”. Then the first line should be replaced with
something like
has_purpose:{
FitnessRecommendation,
contact: SMS}
Moreover, a customer of BeFit may consent to the first or
the second argument of the union, or both. Then her consent
would be encoded, respectively, with the first simple policy,
the second simple policy, or both. Similarly, each single
process in the controller’s lines of business may use only
biometric data, only location data, or both. Accordingly,
it may be associated to the first simple policy, the second
simple policy, or both.
SPECIAL’s vocabularies are temporarily derived by adapt-
ing previous standardized terms introduced by initiatives
related to privacy and DRM, such as P3P8 and ODRL,9
while more refined vocabularies are being developed through
8http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11
9https://www.w3.org/TR/odrl/
W3C’s Data Privacy Vocabularies and Controls Community
Group, (DPVCG),10 promoted by SPECIAL and spanning
over a range of stakeholders wider than the project’s con-
sortium.
As shown in Example 3.1, usage policies can be formatted
with a minor extension of Jason (in particular, compound
terms and policy sets require additional operators), while
vocabularies can be encoded in RDFS or lightweight profiles
of OWL2 such as OWL2-EL and OWL2-QL.
Internally, SPECIAL’s components encode also policies
and the entries of the transparency ledger with a fragment
(profile) of OWL2 called PL (policy logic) [12]. The
adoption of a logic-based description language has manifold
reasons. First, it has a clean, unambiguous semantics, that is
a must for policy languages. A formal approach brings the
following advantages:
• strong correctness and completeness guarantees on the
algorithms for permission checking and compliance
checking;
• the mutual coherence of the different reasoning tasks
related to policies, such as policy validation, permission
checking, compliance checking, and explanations (cf.
tasks T1–T4 and the subsequent paragraph);
• correct usage after data is transferred to other con-
trollers (i.e. interoperability).
The last point is related to so-called sticky policies [13], that
constitute a sort of a license that applies to the data released
to third parties. It is essential that all parties understand the
sticky policy in the same way.
Policies are modelled as OWL2 classes. If the policy
describes a controller’s activity, then its instances represent
all the operations that the controller may possibly execute. If
the policy describes consent, then its instances represent all
the operations permitted by the data subject. A description
of (part of) the controller’s activity – called business policy
in SPECIAL – complies with a consent policy if the former
is a subclass of the latter, that is, all the possible operations
described by the business policies are also permitted by the
given consent.
Example 3.2: Consider again Example 3.1. The Jason-
like representation used there can be directly mapped onto
an OWL2 class ObjectUnionOf(P1 P2), where P2 is:
ObjectIntersectionOf(
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_purpose SocialNetworking )
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_data LocationData)
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_processing Transfer)
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_recipient DataSubjFriends)
ObjectSomeValueFrom(
has_storage ObjectIntersectionOf(
10www.w3.org/community/dpvcg/
ObjectSomeValueFrom(has_location: EU)
DataSomeValueFrom(has_duration
DatatypeRestriction(xsd:integer
xsd:minInclusive "365"ˆˆxsd:integer
xsd:maxInclusive "1825"ˆˆxsd:integer
)))
(with omit P1 due to space limitations; the reader may easily
derive it by analogy with the above example).
In order to check whether a business policy BP (encoded
as an OWL2 class) complies with the above policy one
should check whether
SubClassOf(BP ObjectUnionOf(P1 P2))
is a logical consequence of the ontology that defines SPE-
CIAL’s vocabularies.
The encoding of policies as classes facilitates the re-use
of available consent (which is the preferred option, when
applicable, given the impact of repeated consent requests on
user experience). The GDPR sometimes allows to process
personal data for a purpose other than that for which the
data has been collected, provided that the new purpose
is “compatible” with the initial purpose.11 Compatibility
cannot be assessed automatically, in general, because it is not
formalized in the regulation, and involves enough subtleties
to need the assessment of a lawyer. However, by expressing
purposes as classes, one can at least have the data subject
consent upfront to a specified range of “similar” purposes.
Roughly speaking, the accepted class of purposes is like
an agreement – between data subjects and controllers – on
which purposes are “compatible” in the given context. Also
expressing the other policy properties (P2–P6) as classes is
beneficial. As data subjects consent to wider classes of usage
modalities, the need for additional consent requests tends to
decrease, thereby improving usability and reducing the costs
associated to consent requests. Consider that sometimes the
difficulties involved in reaching out the data subjects, and
the concern that too many requests may annoy users, make
controllers decide not to deliver a service that requires
additional consent.
C. Fast Compliance Checking Algorithms
Business policies (that describe the processing of each
of the controller’s processes) are not only needed to fulfil
the requirements of Article 30. They can also be used
to check whether a running process complies with the
available consent, as a sort of access control system. Several
implementation strategies are possible, depending on the
controller’s system architecture; to fix ideas, the reader may
consider the following generic approach: Each of the con-
troller’s processes is labelled with a corresponding business
policy that describes it, and before processing a piece of
data, the business policy is compared with the data subject’s
consent to check whether the operation is permitted.
11See for example articles 5.1 (b) and 6.4.
In general, such compliance checks occur frequently
enough to call for a scalable implementation. Consider, for
example, a telecom provider that collects location infor-
mation to offer location-based services. Locations cannot
be stored without a legal basis, such as law requirements
or consent – not even temporarily, while a batch process
selects the parts that can be legally kept. So compliance
checking needs to be executed on the fly. In order to estimate
the amount of compliance checks involved, consider that
the events produced by the provider’s base stations are
approximately 15000 per second; the probing records of wi-
fi networks are about 850 millions per day.
In order to meet such performance requirements, SPE-
CIAL has developed ad-hoc reasoning algorithms for PL
[12], that leverage PL’s simplicity to achieve unprecedented
reasoning speed. Compliance checking is split into two
phases: first, business policies are normalized and closed
under the axioms contained in the vocabularies; in the
second phase, business policies are compared with consent
policies with a structural subsumption algorithm. We have
just completed the evaluation of a sequential Java imple-
mentation of those algorithms, called PLR. We chose Java
to facilitate the comparison with other engines, by exploit-
ing the standard OWL APIs, and we refrained to apply
parallelization techniques in order to assess the properties
of the basic algorithms. Before discussing more performant
implementation options, we report the results for PLR.
PLR can pre-compute the first phase, since the business
policies are known in advance and are typically persistent.
So the runtime cost is reduced to structural subsumption.
In this way, on the test cases derived from SPECIAL’s use
cases (cf. Table I), the performance we achieve, respectively,
is 150µsec and 190µsec per compliance check, using the
following system:
processor: Intel Xeon Silver 4110
cores: 8
cache: 11M
RAM: 198 GB
OS: Ubuntu 18.4
JVM: 1.8.0 181
heap: 32 GB (actually used: less than 700 MB).
This means that PLR alone can execute about 6000 com-
pliance checks per second and more than 518 millions per
day, that is, 60% of wi-fi probing events and 40% of base
station events.
In order to raise performance up to the required levels,
one can re-engineer PLR using a language more performant
than Java, and/or parallelize processing by means of big
data architectures (discussed below). Compliance checking
is particularly well suited to parallelization, since each test
is independent from the others and no synchronization is
required. Additionally, the investigation of parallelization
within PLR’s algorithms is under investigation.
Pilot 1 Pilot 2
Ontology
inclusions 186 186
disjoint class axioms 11 11
property range axioms 10 10
functional properties 8 8
classification hierarchy height 4 4
Business policies
# generated policies 120 100
avg. simple pol. per full pol. 2.71 2.39
Consent policies
# generated policies 12,000 10,000
avg. simple pol. per full pol. 3.77 3.42
Test cases
# compliance checks 12,000 10,000
Table I: Size of the test cases derived from SPECIAL’s pilots
D. Compliance Checking Architectures
SPECIAL-K is an Apache Kafka12 distributed streaming
platform that enables personal data processing compliance
checking and transparency. The SPECIAL-K system com-
ponents, depicted in Figure 1, include:
Personal Data Inventory: This component is responsible
for a preliminary analysis aimed at determining: What data
is collected and which data points would be classified as
personal data; what is the purpose of data collection and
processing; where are collected data stored; for how long
are the data stored; with whom is the data shared. Such
information is needed in order to configure the SPECIAL-K
architecture.
Personal Data Gateway: The gateway component is re-
sponsible for enabling the personal data processing/sharing
events generated by existing Line of Business applications
to be intercepted by Apache Kafka.
Applications & Personal Data Processing Topics: Each
application log is represented using a distinct Kafka topic,
while a separate compliance topic is used to store the
enriched log after compliance checks have been completed.
MongoDB & Consent and Policy Log Kafka Topic: The
prevailing consent, usage policies and the respective vocab-
ularies are stored in a Mongo database, while changes to
consent and business policies are recorded in a Kafka topic
called “Consent and Policy Log”.
Compliance Checker: The compliance checker component
uses the consent together with business policies and the
application logs provided by Kafka to check that data
processing and sharing complies with the relevant usage
control policies. The results of this check are saved onto
a new Kafka topic called “Compliance Log”.
Consent, Transparency & Compliance Backends: The
interaction between the various architectural components is
12https://kafka.apache.org/
managed by mu.semte.ch13 an open source micro-services
framework for building RDF enabled applications.
Consent, Transparency & Compliance Dashboards: Users
interact with the system via the consent management user
interface and the transparency and compliance dashboards.
The former supports granting and revoking consent for
processing and data sharing. The latter provides the data
subject with transparency with respect to data processing
and sharing events in a digestible manner.
Elasticsearch: As logs can be serialized using JSON-LD,
it is also possible to benefit from the faceting browsing capa-
bilities of Elasticsearch14 and the out of the box visualization
capabilities provided by Kibana15.
In order to improve the performance of our PLR algorithm
(which alone is only able to deal 60% of wi-fi probing
events and 40% of base station events), we are currently in
the process of preparing the SPECIAL-K benchmark. The
objective of the benchmark is to evaluate the performance of
the PLR algorithm based on realistic test cases derived from
SPECIAL’s pilots, and to further stress test the algorithm
from a scalability perspective using synthetic test cases of
increasing size. The goal of the former tests is to investigate
the suitability of the SPECIAL-K platform to cater for real-
istic policies, while the latter focus on identifying potential
choke points or bottlenecks.
IV. BIG DATA ASPECTS
Big data are not only the input of anonymization and
analytics, or the domain to be modelled with SPECIAL’s
vocabularies. This section illustrates – in terms of the usual
four ‘v’ – the aspects related to big data that arise in
SPECIAL’s components themselves.
Volume: The SPECIAL-K system enables data subjects,
controllers, processors, and supervisory authorities to verify
that personal data is processed according to consent granted
by the respective data subject. It does so by recording a
history of changes to consent in the Consent and Policy
Log Kafka Topic, by storing all data processing and sharing
events in the Personal Data Processing Topic, and by persist-
ing the result of the compliance checking in the Compliance
Log Kafka Topic. Thus in SPECIAL, Kafka plays the role
of a high-performance, low latency, distributed filesystem,
which is used to persist our append only logs.
Velocity: Considering the need for real time compliance
checking, arising from the SPECIAL uses cases, SPECIAL-
K is designed to deal with a constant flow of data events
(i.e., an event stream). In the case of the location based
services, discussed in section III, this roughly equates to
approximately 15000 base station events per second; and
850 million wifi network probing events per day.
13https://mu.semte.ch/
14https://www.elastic.co/products/elasticsearch
15https://www.elastic.co/products/kibana
Figure 1: SPECIAL-K architecture [14]
Variety: SPECIAL’s components and architecture shall be
integrated in existing systems, whose application domain
cannot be restricted a priori. Both the data categories and
their encoding (format) may significantly vary across dif-
ferent controllers and (for large companies) even within
the organization’s borders. The dashboards that support
data subjects in exercising their rights and monitoring data
usage shall process such multiplicity of data, and inter-
act with different instantiations of SPECIAL, which adds
to the variety of the involved data. SPECIAL addresses
variety via the personal data inventory (from an analysis
and semantic representation perspective), the personal data
gateway (enabling existing Line of Business applications to
interface with the SPECIAK-K platform), and the DPVCG’s
standardization initiative (cf. Section III-B). The latter is
aimed at creating a framework of general classes of common
interest, that can be extended with application-specific terms.
Such a framework enhances interoperability and guides the
formulation of application-specific vocabularies.
Veracity: From a SPECIAL perspective, veracity is about
the faithfulness of policies and log events with regard to
the human-readable text in the consent requests and the
actual behavior of the system. Here, there is a need to
automatically construct human readable text from policy
annotations, to automatically reconstruct systems workflows
from data processing and sharing events, and to verify the
correctness of the human readable policies and workflows
with the help of human experts. Both of which are the
subject of future work.
V. RELATED WORK
Considering the well known utility versus privacy trade-
off associated with the suppression and generalization tech-
niques for anonymization, there is a new stream of research
which focuses on using deep learning to synthesize data,
which is representitive of real data [15], [16]. Although such
personal data synthesis could potentially address the utility
issue, the privacy guarantees offered by such approaches is
still an open research question.
From a GDPR compliance perspective, there exist several
compliance tools (cf. [17], [18], [19], [20]) that enable
companies to assess the compliance of their applications
and business processes via predefined questionnaires. Ad-
ditionally, there is a body of work that focuses on mod-
elling the text of the GDPR in a manner that supports
legal reasoning and compliance checking [21], [22], [23],
[24], [25]. Other work in this area, demonstrates how the
European Legislation Identifier (ELI) ontology can be used
to model the GDPR as linked data [26]. Outputs include a
DCAT16 catalog containing the official text of the GDPR
and a SKOS17 ontology defining concepts related to GDPR.
De Hert et al. [27] propose a systematic interpretation of
16DCAT, https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-dcat/
17SKOS, https://www.w3.org/TR/skos-reference/
the right to data portability from both a minimalist and an
empowering perspective.
Both rule languages and OWL2 have already been used
as policy languages; a non-exhaustive list is [28], [29],
[30], [31], [32]. As noted in [33], the advantage of OWL2
– hence description logics – is that all the main policy-
reasoning tasks are decidable (and tractable if policies can be
expressed with OWL2 profiles), while compliance checking
is undecidable in rule languages, or at least intractable –
in the absence of recursion – because it can be reduced
to datalog query containment. So an OWL2-based policy
language is a natural choice in a project like SPECIAL,
where policy comparison is the predominant task. Among
the aforementioned languages, both Rei and Protune [31],
[32] support logic program rules, which make them un-
suitable to SPECIAL’s purposes. KAoS [30] is based on
a description logic that, in general, is not tractable, and
supports role-value maps – a construct that easily makes
reasoning undecidable (see [34], Chap. 5). The papers on
KAoS do not discuss how to address this issue.
P3P’s privacy policies – that are encoded in XML
– and simple PL policies have a similar structure:
the tag STATEMENT contains tags PURPOSE, RECIPIENT,
RETENTION, and DATA-GROUP, that correspond to the anal-
ogous properties of SPECIAL’s usage policies. Only the
information on the location of data is missing. The tag
STATEMENT is included in a larger context that adds informa-
tion about the controller (tag ENTITY) and about the space
of web resources covered by the policy (through so-called
policy reference files). Such additional pieces of information
can be directly encoded with simple PL concepts.
There exist several well-engineered reasoners for OWL2
and its profiles. Hermit [35] is a general reasoner for OWL2.
Over the test cases inspired by SPECIAL’s use cases, it takes
3.67ms and 3.96ms per compliance check, respectively, that
is, over 20 times longer than PLR. ELK [36] is a specialized
polynomial-time reasoner for the OWL2-EL profile. It does
not support functional roles, nor the interval constraints
used to model storage duration, therefore it cannot be used
to reason on the PL profile. Konclude [37] is a highly
optimized reasoner with “pay-as-you-go” strategies (i.e. it
becomes more efficient on less complex profiles of OWL2).
Konclude is designed for classification, and is currently
not optimized for subsumption tests (i.e. the reasoning task
underlying compliance checks). Consequently, it turns out
to be slower than Hermit on our test cases.
VI. CONCLUSION, FURTHER ISSUES, AND FUTURE
WORK
The GDPR allows exploratory analytics to be carried out
only on anonymous data. Unfortunately, the anonymization
techniques available today are not guaranteed to produce
results that are anonymous in the GDPR’s sense. Moreover,
anonymization is known to reduce the quality and the utility
of data. As a consequence, in many cases it is preferrable
to adopt explicit consent as the legal basis for personal data
processing.
It is profitable to adopt a semantic representation of
consent, in order to ensure correct interoperability (e.g.
through sticky policies), and get stronger correctness and
completeness guarantees on the several algorithms that
perform compliance checking, support auditing and user
rights, and provide explanations about the consequences
of policies and consent. Semantic representation does not
mean slow processing. With suitable algorithms and big
data architectures, it is possible to achieve the required
performance in demanding application contexts.
The class-based consent management proposed in SPE-
CIAL may also provide a viable means to apply exploratory
analyses and mining techniques to non-anonymous data,
to some extent. For instance, SPECIAL could be used
in order to obtain consent for the ”analysis” of ”location
data” for the purpose of ”improving BeFits wearable fitness
appliances” (a flexible definition, yet still more specific
than the fully generic ”finding novel interesting relationships
among data”). Data mining could then be applied to the
bundle of personal data of all customers that consent to such
data usage. Of course, the company would need to ensure
that the processing complies with the stated consent policy;
for example, only location data should be analyzed, and the
goal of their analysis should be ”improving BeFits wearable
fitness appliances” and nothing else. From a legality per-
spective, it has yet to be determined if ”improving BeFits
wearable fitness appliances” would be seen as specific
enough. Additionally, in general, it is unknown at this point
how to prevent the analysis from leading to other insights,
not permitted by the consent policy.
The SPECIAL-K system is based on the Apache Kafka
distributed streaming platform, which has already proven
its effectiveness in terms of its ability to handle high
volumes and velocity (cf. [38], [39], [40]). However, when it
comes to compliance checking and transparency for personal
data processing, there are a number of open challenges
concerning variety and veracity. From a variety perspec-
tive, there is the need to semantically encode the data,
purpose, processing, storage and sharing associated with
existing Line of Business applications, however a necessary
first step is to determine where personal data is located
and how it is used within the company. The SPECIAL
consortium are currently investigating the use of automated
data and knowledge discovery techniques to gain insights
into personal data which is usually scattered across several
systems (cf. [41], [14]). Whereas from a veracity perspective,
it is necessary to verify that business policies faithfully
represent the data processing and sharing performed by the
corresponding Line of Business application. Here, existing
work on process conformance checking, such as [42], [43],
provide for interesting starting points. Additionally, there is
a need to automatically construct human readable policies
from SPECIAL usage policies, for instance by leveraging ex-
isting approaches for the generation of text from computer-
executable code (cf. [44], [45]).
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